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3.14 Rio 2016 and the birth of Brazilian transparency 
Andy Spalding, Pat Barr, Albert Flores, Kat Gavin, Shaun Freiman, Tyler Klink, Carter Nichols, Ann Reid and 
Rina Van Orden1 
Brazil’s modern democracy is but three decades old. With the Brazilian people now taking to the 
streets in protest at public corruption, the government is enacting new laws and learning to effectively 
enforce them. The nation is thus feeling the growing pains of an emergent commitment to transparency. 
 
In this, the window between Brazil’s hosting of the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Summer 
Olympics, it is timely to ask what the spotlight of these two events has revealed about the nation’s anti-
corruption measures. How is the government responding to exposed corruption risk? Will the Olympics 
ultimately make good on their promise to be an agent of positive change? This brief article discusses 
issues related to Brazil’s federal anti-corruption laws generally, its changing procurement laws and the 
Olympic contracts and governance organisations. 
 
A rapidly evolving legal system 
After the monarchy was overthrown in the late nineteenth century, Brazil went through four distinct 
government models before emerging as a democracy in 1985.2 The cultural belief that corruption was 
inherent, acceptable and necessary – the ‘jeitinho brasileiro’ (loosely translated as the ‘Brazilian way’) 
– emerged from the wreckage of a century of unstable and/or authoritarian rule.3 
 
Many Brazilians believe that Brazil is changing culturally, however, and that the people will have a 
measure of success in rooting out corruption.4 Young Brazilians especially are calling for reform both 
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within the government and society. This movement is exemplified by recent protests against President 
Dilma Rousseff and the perceived corruption in her administration.5  
 
Brazil’s system of government is itself designed, at least in part, to curb corruption. Seemingly heeding 
Lord Acton’s famous admonition that “absolute power corrupts absolutely,” the constitution grants an 
extraordinary amount of authority to the states and local governments to govern themselves.6 The 
country’s brand of federalism appears to be grounded in an institutional and cultural distrust for 
centralised power, probably borne of its recent history. To the extent that Brazil’s federalism succeeds 
in preventing the concentration of power, it creates conditions that have historically tended to limit 
corruption.   
 
In seeking to check corruption, however, Brazilian federalism also creates a distinct corruption risk.  
This risk is exemplified, perhaps ironically, in Brazil’s recent landmark federal statute, referred to 
variously as the Anti-Corruption Law or the Clean Companies Act. The statute creates corporate 
liability for bribery, and contains various provisions that incentivise compliance and facilitate public 
enforcement.7 Although the passage of the Clean Companies Act is a watershed moment for Brazil’s 
anti-corruption movement, the law was enacted without an integrated national enforcement system. 
What exists now is a fragmented enforcement regime consisting of autonomous entities that compete 
both within and between the federal, state and municipal levels. It remains uncertain as to how the new 
statute will eventually be enforced, or by whom; it was hardly used at all to curb World Cup corruption. 
In response both to this uncertainty and to the continuing anti-corruption protests, the Rousseff 
administration has recently passed a decree that clarifies key areas of the statute.8 Many believe that it 
will be years before scholars, lawyers and judges are able sort it all out, however. Only time will tell 
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whether the government can effectively enforce this law to reduce corruption in connection with the 
Olympics. 
 
Brazil’s procurement regime is also now evolving, with implications for curbing Olympic corruption 
that remain unclear. The applicable law for public procurement purposes prior to the 2014 football 
World Cup was Federal Law no. 8,666/1993.9 The main criticism of this law was that it required the 
government to go through two requests for proposals (RFPs), the first for the project design, called the 
‘technical project’, the second for the actual construction. Typically, different companies would win 
each of the bids, leading to a misalignment of incentives. Procurement lawyers frequently lamented this 
messy state of affairs, from which litigators profit handsomely.10  
 
The Olympics and World Cup gave Brazil a chance to experiment with a new bidding law. In 2011 the 
government enacted Federal Law no. 12,462, the Regime Diferenciado de Contratações Públicas, or 
‘RDC’.11 The RDC seeks to make bidding procedures more efficient by removing the requirement for a 
technical project RFP. Another provision included in the RDC makes the budget for government 
projects confidential. In theory, a ‘blind’ bidding process should produce more competitive offers for 
the government: bidders are forced to set prices without knowing their competitors’ prices, potentially 
preventing bid inflation. Anonymity in bidding may also create corruption risk, however, as bidders 
cannot keep each other in check. Furthermore, two lawsuits have been filed that challenge the 
constitutionality of the blind bidding process.12 
 
The RDC and the Clean Companies Act, as well as the enforcement mechanisms that give life to each 
of them, will of course remain long after the Olympic Games are gone. They are part of the legal 
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infrastructure that will prove an important component of the Games’ legacy. Brazil has also adopted a 
number of measures specifically for the Olympics, however, as discussed below. 
 
Olympic anti-corruption measures 
Brazil has implemented a number of anti-corruption laws and institutions specifically for the Olympics. 
The Autoridade Pública Olímpica (APO) is the primary Olympic authority in Rio de Janeiro, and it 
integrates the federal, state and municipal governments in the planning of the Games.13 This is a unique 
body in Brazil – the first and only public body to bring all three levels of the government together – and 
it was one of the strongest points of Rio’s bid.14 The organisation allocates responsibilities and 
coordinates preparation for the Games among the many entities, public and private, that are overseeing 
the construction infrastructure, and revitalization projects taking place around Rio. These entities 
include the Empresa Olímpica Municipal (the municipal body in charge of many of the stadium and 
infrastructure projects and operating out of the Rio mayor’s office)15 and Rio 2016 (the private 
organisation responsible for the events and athletes during the Olympic Games),16 as well as the 
participating offices of the federal and state governments.17 
 
Given the large sums of money at play in preparation for the Olympics, and Brazil’s rank as the 69th 
perceived least corrupt country in the world,18 speculation involving construction-related corruption for 
the games is prevalent. This speculation is only compounded by the recent corruption scandals 
involving Petrobras and the construction industry.19 The two overarching features providing public 
transparency and hedging against corruption for the games are the Responsibility Matrix (Matriz de 
Responsibilidades) provided by the APO and the auditing provided by the Tribunal de Contas do 
Município do Rio de Janeiro (TCMRJ).20 
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The Responsibility Matrix, as mentioned above, tracks all commitments of government agencies for 
projects directly related to the Rio 2016 Games, be they the responsibility of the federal government, 
the state government or the municipal government. Although a useful tool in tracking construction 
progress, the document has its limits: it is effectively available only in Portuguese, as the English 
version21 is updated infrequently; it lists a budget and deadlines only for those projects with a 
‘maturation level’ of 3, on a scale from 1 to 6; and it tracks projects only within its third of the 
budget.22 
 
The TCMRJ is one of two municipal auditing oversight courts in Brazil. In this capacity, it monitors 
government procurement activities by analysing construction bidding documents, before the execution 
of the contract and during inspections, and it also examines the rendering of accounts.23 It is the body 
responsible for ensuring that the people of Rio have fair government contracting and that these 
contracts are completed on time and on budget. One of the major issues that the TCMRJ faces leading 
up to 2016 is the sheer volume of contracts that it has to oversee. In one of the largest cities in the 
world, already overseeing all government expenditures, the body must now add to its administrative 
burden all municipal contracting arising from the Olympic Games. 
 
These infrastructure projects create an additional corruption risk of a very different kind. As with the 
2014 World Cup, the Olympics will almost inevitably elicit protests by Brazilian citizens living in the 
favelas, and other disaffected citizens, who have grown tired of corruption. Corruption is particularly 
prevalent within the Pacifying Police Units, whose purpose is to bring security to favelas. These 
officers are reported to steal personal and residential property to sell and make a profit from, without 
any kind of accountability.24 
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An additional source of Olympic law relevant to corruption risk is the contractual obligations that the 
bid city undertakes with the International Olympic Committee (IOC). When a city is selected to host 
the Games, the promises made in the course of the bid become contractual obligations. The pressure to 
deliver on these obligations has the potential to encourage corner-cutting, and to open the way for 
corruption. Some of the promises made in Rio’s Candidature File are the expansion of the capacity of 
Rio International Airport, a renovation of Rio’s port and a guarantee that all three of Brazil’s levels of 
government (federal, state and municipal) will cover any economic shortfall encountered by the 
Organising Committee.25 The Committee has estimated that more than 30 million items are needed to 
meet the demands of the 2016 Olympic and Paralympic Games.26 
 
Despite these myriad risks, the IOC does not appear to be helping much to reduce Olympic corruption 
in Rio. In contrast to the highly detailed sponsor- and trademark-related guarantees that the IOC 
typically demands from host cities, none of the host city documents contains an anti-corruption 
guarantee. Similarly, our interviews with various individuals doing Olympics-related work revealed a 
widely held perception that the IOC simply is not concerned about host city corruption. While insisting 
on protecting the commercial interests of its sponsors, the IOC does not seem to have a comparable 
insistence on protecting the host city’s citizens from corruption. 
 
Conclusion 
This short article has provided just a cursory discussion of Brazil’s anti-corruption framework in 
advance of Rio2016. Ultimately, it remains to be seen whether enforcement will prove more robust for 
the Olympics than it was for the World Cup. A full report, to be released in the spring of 2016, will 
discuss these and many other issues in substantial detail. The world deserves to know all that Brazil has 
done to curb public corruption, and all it still has to do. 
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Box 3.3 Projeto Jogos Limpos: the Clean Games project in Brazil 
Instituto Ethos27 
When Brazil was chosen to host the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) 2014 
World Cup and the 2016 Olympic and Paralympic Games, the Ethos Institute of Business and Social 
Responsibility launched the ‘Clean Games: Inside and Outside Stadiums’ project, with the goal of 
increasing transparency and preventing corruption in the preparation of the events.28 Companies and 
public officials signed transparency and anti-corruption agreements, and the project also created tools 
for government and civil society to monitor public expenditure related to both events. 
 
Following the approval of the federal Anti-Corruption Law29 and the Access to Information Law in 
recent years,30 both of which the project campaigned for, the Ethos Institute has seen greater 
transparency in the dealings between among local governments and an increase in the willingness of 
companies to engage in collaboration towards integrity. 
 
Engaging governments 
The Ethos Institute has employed three strategies to pressure local governments to increase 
transparency in public expenditure. First, it set up a network of local branches in each of the 12 World 
Cup host cities. Second, it secured the commitment of mayoral candidates in these cities to increase 
transparency and engaged them to ensure that anti-corruption measures were on their agendas for 
the 2012 municipal elections (in which 89 per cent of the candidates committed themselves to 
‘transparency pacts’). 
 
The project also developed ‘Transparency Indicators for Local and State Governments’, which 
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enabled media and civil society to monitor governments’ expenditure effectively, and governments to 
improve transparency by using the indicators as a checklist. The success of these strategies is visible 
in the improved performance of cities and states according to the Transparency Indicators; in one year 
11 of the 12 cities improved their performance, as well as 10 of the 11 states (the Federal District was 
counted only as a city). Moreover, the Ethos Institute was able to engage governments by holding 
high-level meetings in seven cities in three different states. 
 
Engaging companies 
There have been two main approaches for engaging and supporting companies. The first is the 
publication Fighting Corruption in Sport Sponsorship and Hospitality: A Practical Guide for Companies 
(and the discussions organised around it), developed in collaboration with the UN Global Compact to 
prevent corruption by providing a practical framework for managing sports sponsorship in a 
transparent and responsible manner.31 The second approach consists of ‘sectoral agreements’: 
voluntary anti-corruption agreements signed by individual companies from given sectors. This 
collective action model was inspired by a similar initiative in Colombia, whereby companies commit to 
observe various transparency and anti-corruption principles. 
 
Although there was considerable difficulty at first in persuading companies to commit to these 
agreements, two sectoral agreements have now been secured since the Anti-Corruption Law entered 
into force. The first, among companies from the health product sector and headed by the Ethos 
Institute with the support of the Brazilian Association of Importers and Distributors of Implants 
(Abraidi), was signed in mid-2015. The second, involving a number of sports sponsorship companies, 
has been led by Ethos in partnership with the Atletas pelo Brasil (Athletes for Brazil, composed of 
current and former athletes) non-governmental organisation. Several sponsors of FIFA and the 
Confederação Brasileira de Futebol are due to sign in a ceremony in August 2015. 
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10.pdf. 
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11 Lei no. 12.462 (Federal Law no. 12,462/2011), www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2011-
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www.stf.jus.br/portal/processo/verProcessoAndamento.asp?incidente=4131802. For a lawsuit filed by the 
Attorney General of the Republic, see 
www.stf.jus.br/portal/processo/verProcessoAndamento.asp?incidente=4138546. See also Daniel Teixeira, ‘The 
differential public procurement regime (‘RDC’) for the 2014 Brazil FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Rio Olympics’ 
paper presented at 6th International Public Procurement Conference, 15 August 2014. 
13 Autoridade Pública Olímpica, ‘About APO’, www.apo.gov.br/index.php/about-apo. 
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